Abstract-The wiretap channel has been devised and studied first by Wyner, and subsequently extended to the case with nondegraded general wiretap channels by Csiszár and Körner. Focusing mainly on the stationary memoryless channel with cost constraint, we newly introduce the notion of reliability and secrecy functions as a fundamental tool to analyze and/or design the performance of an efficient wiretap channel system, including binary symmetric wiretap channels, Poisson wiretap channels, and Gaussian wiretap channels. Compact formulas for those functions are explicitly given for stationary memoryless wiretap channels. It is also demonstrated that, based on such a pair of reliability and secrecy functions, we can control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (usually conflicting), both with exponentially decreasing rates as block length n becomes large. Four ways to do so are given on the basis of rate shifting, rate exchange, concatenation, and change of cost constraint. In addition, the notion of the δ secrecy capacity is defined and shown to attain the strongest secrecy standard among others. The maximized versus averaged secrecy measures is also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE pioneering work by Wyner [1] as well as by Csiszár and Körner [2] , based on the wiretap channel model, has provided a strong impetus to find a new scheme of the physical layer cryptography in a good balance of usability and secrecy. In particular, they have first formulated the tradeoff between the transmission rate for Bob and the equivocation rate against Eve. Since then, there have been extensive studies on various kinds of wiretap channels, which are nicely summarized, e.g., in Laourine and Wagner [3] along with the secrecy capacity formula for the Poisson wiretap channel without cost constraint. Among others, Hayashi [4] is the first who has derived the relevant secrecy exponent function to specify the exponentially decreasing speed (i.e., exponent) of the leaked information under the average secrecy criterion when no cost constraint is considered. Throughout in this paper, we are imposed cost constraints (limit on available transmission energy, bandwidth, and so on). We first address, given a general wiretap channel, the primal problem to establish a general formula to simultaneously summarize the reliability performance for Bob and the secrecy performance against Eve under the maximum secrecy criterion. Next, it is shown that both of them are described by using exponentially decaying functions of the code length when a stationary memoryless wiretap channel is considered. This provides the theoretical basis for investigating the asymptotic behavior of reliability and secrecy. We can then specifically quantify achievable reliability exponents and achievable secrecy exponents as well as the tradeoff between them for several important wiretap channel models such as binary symmetric wiretap channels, Poisson wiretap channels, Gaussian wiretap channels. In particular, four ways of the tradeoff to control reliability and secrecy are given and discussed with their novel significance. Also, on the basis of the analysis of these exponents under cost constraint, the new formula for the δ-secrecy capacity (with the strongest secrecy among others) is established to apply to several typical wiretap channel models. A remarkable feature of this paper is that we first derive the key formulas not depending on respective specific channel models and then apply them to those respective cases to get new insights into each case as well.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the definitions of wiretap channel and related notions such as error probability, cost constraint, secrecy capacity and concatenation are introduced along with various kinds of secrecy measures.
In Section III.A, we give a fundamental formula to simultaneously evaluate a pair of reliability behavior and secrecy behavior under cost constraint for a general wiretap channel, which is then in Section III.B, particularized to establish the specific formulas for stationary and memoryless wiretap channels. Here, the notions of reliability function and secrecy function are introduced to evaluate the exponent of the exponentially decreasing decoding error for Bob and that of the exponentially decreasing divergence distance against Eve for the stationary memoryless wiretap channel under cost constraint. This is one of the key results in this paper. However, it should be kept in mind here that neither the reliability function nor the the secrecy function thus defined implies the optimality with the converse parts. In this sense, to avoid confusion, we may use also the terms such that achievable reliability 0018-9448 © 2014 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
functions and achievable secrecy functions. We also present their numerical examples to see how the reliability and secrecy exponents vary depending on the channel and cost parameters. Also, superiority of the maximum secrecy criterion to the average secrecy criterion is discussed. In Section III.C, a strengthening of Theorem 3.3 in Section III.B is provided. In Section III.D, the δ-secrecy capacity formula (with the strongest secrecy) is given under cost constraint, including the formula for a special but important case with more capable wiretap channels.
In Section IV, four ways for the tradeoff are demonstrated: one is by rate shifting, another one by rate exchange, one more by concatenation, and the other by change of cost constraint, which are discussed in terms of the reliability and secrecy exponents. This section is thus prepared for more quantitative analysis/design of the reliability-secrecy tradeoff.
In Section V, the formula for the δ-secrecy capacity is applied to the Poisson wiretap channel with cost constraint, which is a practical model for free-space Laser communication with a photon counter.
In Section VI, for Poisson wiretap channels with cost constraint we demonstrate the reliability and secrecy functions as an application of the key theorem established in Section III.B.
In Section VII, we investigate the effects of channel concatenation with an auxiliary channel for the Poisson wiretap channel.
In Section VIII, the δ-secrecy capacity formula for the Gaussian wiretap channel is given as an application of the key theorem established in Section III.D.
In Section IX, for the Gaussian wiretap channels with cost constraint we demonstrate the reliability and secrecy functions as an application of the key theorem established in Section III.B. In particular, these functions are numerically compared with those of Gallager-type, which reveals that a kind of duality exists among them. In Section X, we conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BASIC CONCEPTS
In this section we give the definition of the wiretap channel. There are several levels and ways to specify the superiority of the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, to the eavesdropper, Eve, such as physically degraded Eve, (statistically) degraded Eve, less noisy Bob, and more capable Bob. In this paper, we are interested mainly in the last class of channels because the other ones imply the last one (see Csiszár and Körner [9] ).
We introduce here the necessary notions and notations to quantify the reliability and the secrecy of this kind of wiretap channel model. In particular, we define several kinds of secrecy metrics, including the strongest criterion based on the divergence distance with reference to a target output distribution, while the notion of concatenation of channels is also introduced to construct a possible way to control tradeoff between reliability and secrecy.
A. Wiretap Channel
Let X , Y, Z be arbitrary alphabets (not necessarily finite), where X is called an input alphabet, and Y, Z are called output alphabets. A general wiretap channel consists of two general channels, i.e., W n B : X n → Y n (from Alice for Bob) and W n E : X n → Z n (from Alice against Eve), where W n B (y|x), W n E (z|x) are the conditional probabilities of y ∈ Y n , z ∈ Z n given x ∈ X n (of block length n), respectively. Alice wants to communicate with Bob as reliably as possible but as secretly as possible against Eve. We let (W n B , W n E ) indicate such a wiretap channel.
Given a message set M n ≡ {1, 2, . . . , M n }, we consider a stochastic encoder for Alice ϕ n : M n → X n and a decoder for Bob ψ B n : Y n → M n , and for i ∈ M n let ϕ B n (i ) denote the output due to ϕ n (i ) via channel W n B .
B. Cost Constraint
From the viewpoint of communication technologies, it is sometimes needed to impose cost constraint on channel inputs. Here we give its formal definition.
For n = 1, 2, . . . fix a mapping c n : X n → R + (the set of nonnegative real numbers) arbitrarily. For x ∈ X n we call c n (x) the cost of x and 1 n c n (x) the cost per letter. In the channel coding problem with cost constraint, we require the encoder outputs ϕ n (i ) ∈ X n satisfy
where is an arbitrarily nonnegative given constant, which we call cost constraint . Notice here that the encoder ϕ n is stochastic. When (1) holds, we say that the encoder ϕ n satisfies the cost constraint and call (W n B , W n E ) a wiretap channel with cost constraint . Incidentally, define
then (1) is rewritten also as
Remark 2.1: Consider the case with c n (x) = n (∀x ∈ X n ) and = 1, then in this case it is easy to check that X n ( ) = X n , which means that the wiretap channel is actually imposed no cost constraint.
C. Error Probability, Secrecy Measures and Secrecy Capacities
Given a wiretap channel (W n B , W n E ) with cost constraint , the error probability B n (measure of reliability) via channel W n B for Bob is defined to be
whereas the divergence distance (measure 1 of secrecy) δ E n and the variational distance (measure 2 of secrecy) ∂ E n via channel W n E against Eve are defined to be
where
and P (i) n denotes the output probability distribution on Z n via channel W n E due to the input ϕ n (i ), and π n is called the target output probability distribution on Z n , which is generated via channel W n E due to an arbitrarily prescribed input distribution P X n on X n . Specifically, π n is given by π n (z) = x∈X n W n (z|x)P X n (x). In this paper the logarithm is taken to the natural base e.
With these two typical measures of secrecy, we can define two kinds of criteria for achievability:
We say that a rate R is (δ, )-achievable if there exists a pair (ϕ n , ψ B n ) of encoder and decoder satisfying criterion (7) and
When there is no fear of confusion, we say simply that a rate R is δ-achievable by dropping cost constraint , and so on also in the sequel. Similarly, we say that a rate R is (∂, )-achievable if there exists a pair (ϕ n , ψ B n ) of encoder and decoder satisfying criterion (8) and (9) . It should be noted Fig. 1 . The implication scheme: The arrow α −→ β means that α is stronger than β; α β means that α coincides with β when π n = P n , where
n is due to [10] and d E n → 1 n I E n is due to [14] . In the finite alphabet case, the exponential decay of d E n (with increasing n) implies that of I E n (see [7] ).
always holds by virtue of the triangle axiom of the variational distance, ∂ E n is stronger than d E n (measure 4 of secrecy: see [7] ), so that criterion 8) is stronger than the d-achievability:
Furthermore, one may sometimes prefer to consider the following achievability (called the w-achievability):
which is nothing but the so-called weak secrecy (measure 5 of secrecy). Indeed, this is the weakest criterion among others; its illustrating example will appear in Examples 5.1 and 8.1, while criterion (7) is the strongest one and introduced for the first time in this paper. Fig. 1 shows the implication scheme among these five measures of secrecy. The secrecy capacities δ-C s ( ) and ∂-C s ( ) between Alice and Bob are defined to be the supremum of all (δ, )-achievable rates and that of all (∂, )-achievable rates, respectively. Similarly, the secrecy capacity d-C s ( ) with d-achievability, the secrecy capacity i-C s ( ) with i-achievability as well as the secrecy capacity w-C s ( ) with w-achievability can also be defined.
Remark 2.2:
One may wonder if the "strongest" measure δ E n of secrecy can be given an operational meaning. In this connection, we would like to cite the paper by Hou and Kramer [8] in which I E n is interpreted as a measure of "non-confusion" and D(P n ||π n ) as a measure of "non-stealth," and π n is interpreted as the background noise distribution on Z n that Eve detects in advance to the communication between Alice and Bob; thus, in view of (12) , by making δ E n → 0 we can not only keep the message secret from Eve but also hide the presence of meaningful communication. Alice can control π n so as to be most perplexng to Eve. A connection to some hypothesis testing problem is also pointed out. A similar interpretation is given also for ∂ E n with d E n as a measure of "non-confusion" and d(P n , π n ) as a measure of "non-stealth," because the following inequality holds:
Remark 2.3:
We notice that all of B n , δ E n , ∂ E n , d E n and I E n , 1 n I E n defined here are the measures averaged over the message set M n with the uniform distribution. On the other hand, we can consider also the criteria maximized over the message set M n , which will be discussed later in Remark 3.9.
D. Concatenation
In wiretap channel coding it is one of the important problems how to control the tradeoff between the reliability for Bob and the secrecy against Eve. There are several ways to control it. One of these is to make use of the concatenation of the main wiretap channel with an auxiliary (virtual) channel. So, it is convenient to state here its formal definition for later use.
Let V be an arbitrary alphabet (not necessarily finite) and let V n be an arbitrary auxiliary random variable with values in V n such that V n → X n → Y n Z n forms a Markov chain in this order, where X n is an input variable for the wiretap channel (W n B , W n E ); and Y n , Z n are the output variables of channels W n B , W n E due to the input X n , respectively.
where * P X n |V n : V n → X n is an arbitrary auxiliary channel.
In particular, we say that a pair (W
with the auxiliary channel P X n |V n . Notice that if V n ≡ X n as random variables then these reduce to the non-concenated wiretap channel.
E. Stationary Memoryless Wiretap Channel
In this paper the substantial attention is payed to the special class of wiretap channels called the stationary memoryless wiretap channel, the definition of which is given by Definition 2.2:
) is said to be stationary and memoryless if, with some channels
This wiretap channel may be denoted simply by (W B , W E ). * We use the convention that, given random variables S and T , P S (·) and P S|T (·|·) denote the probability distribution of S, and the conditional probability distribution of S given T , respectively.
When we are dealing with a stationary memoryless wiretap channel (W B , W E ) it is usual to assume an additive cost c :
. This enables us to analyze the detailed performances of the wiretap channel, to be shown in the following sections.
III. EVALUATION OF RELIABILITY AND SECRECY
In this section, the problem of a general wiretap channel with general cost constraint is first studied, and next the problem of a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost constraint is investigated in details. In particular, with criterion (7) we are interested in exponentially decreasing rates of B n , δ E n as n tends to ∞. Finally, its applicantion to establish a general formula for the δ-secrecy capacity δ-C s ( ) with cost constraint is provided.
A. General Wiretap Channel With Cost Constraint
V n → Z n be arbitrary general channels and Q(v) be an arbitrary auxiliary input distribution on V n , and set
where 
holds for the random variable X n over X n induced via the auxiliary channel P X n |V n by the input variable V n subject to
Proof: See Appendix A. Remark 3.1: Formula (23) without concatenation is due to Gallager [11] , while formulas (24), (25) without concatenation and cost constraint have first been shown in a different context by Han and Verdú [13, p. 768 ] based on a simple random coding argument, and subsequently developed by Hayashi [4] based on a universal hashing argument to establish the cryptographic implication of channel resolvability (see, also Hayashi [6] 
The 
. This implies that concatenation decreases reliability for the channel for Bob. On the other hand, the quantity B n ≡ e −φ(−ρ|W 
which implies that concatenation increases secrecy against the channel for Eve. Thus, we can control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (usually conflicting) by adequate choice of an auxiliary channel P X n |V n (e.g., see Fig. 4 later for the case of stationary memoryless wiretap channels). Furthermore, it should be noted that C n ≡ e −ψ(ρ|W n+ E ,Q) in (24) also has such a nice tradeoff property like in the above, owing to the convexity in W n E (z|x).
B. Stationary Memoryless Wiretap Channel With Cost Constraint
So far we have studied the performance of general wiretap channels with general cost constraint . Suppose now that we are given a stationary and memoryless wiretap channel
, with additive cost c : X → R + . With this important class of channels, we attempt to bring out specific useful insights on the basis of Theorem 3.1. To do so, let us consider the case in which V n X n = (V 1 X 1 , . . . , V n X n ) are i.i.d. variables with common joint distribution
then, the probabilities of X n and V n , and the conditional probability of X n given V n are written as
respectively, where ). Accordingly, these specifications define a joint probability distribution P V XY Z on V × X × Y × Z. Also, the concatenated channel in this case is written simply as
Then, we have one of the key results: Theorem 3.3: Let (W n B , W n E ) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost c : X → R + . Let P V XY Z be a joint probability distribution as above, and suppose that the constraint x∈X P X (x)c(x) ≤ on P X is satisfied. Then, for any positive integers M n , L n , there exists a pair (ϕ n , ψ B n ) of encoder (satisfying cost constraint ) and decoder that satisfies the upper bounds (35) and (36) given at the top of the next page, where we have put q = P V for simplicity, and 0 ≤ α n , β n ≤ 1 are the constants such that lim inf n→∞ α n ≥ lim n→∞ β n = 1 or 1 − 1/ √ 2 to be specified in the proof. 
Gallager [11] used the upper bound
c(
where δ > 0 is an arbitrary small constant. Wyner [15] also used upper bound (38) for Poisson channels. However, we prefer upper bound (37) in this paper (except for in Theorems 9.2 and 9.4 later in Section IX), because it provides us with reasonable evaluation of the reliability and secrecy functions for binary symmetric wiretap channels, for Poisson wiretap channels and also for Gaussian wiretap channels to be treated in this section and in Sections VI, VII and IX. Let us now give more compact forms to (35) and (36). To do so, let us define a reliability exponent function (or simply, reliability function) F c (q, R B , R E , n) for Bob, and a secrecy exponent function (or simply, secrecy function)
where for fixed rates R B , R E we have set M n = e n R B , L n = e n R E , and the functions φ(ρ|W B , q, r ) and φ(−ρ|W E , q, r ) † In the theory of channel coding it is the tradition to use the terminology "reliability function" to denote the "optimal" one. Therefore, more exactly, it might be recommended to use the term such as "achievable reliability exponent (function)" and "achievable secrecy exponent (function)," because here we lack the converse results. However, in this paper, simply for convenience with some abuse of the notation, we do not stick to the optimality and prefer to use their shorthands, because in most cases the optimal computable formula is not known. Then, the term "optimal reliability function" with the converse makes sense. Similarly for the "secrecy function."
are defined as in (41) and (42) 
where it is assumed that P X satisfies
Remark 3.6 (Reliability and Secrecy Functions):
The function F c (q, R B , R E , n) quantifies performance of channel coding (called the random coding exponent of Gallager [11] ), whereas the function H c (q, R E , n) quantifies performance of channel resolvability (see Han and Verdú [13] , Han [12] , Hayashi [4] , [6] ).
Remark 3.7: It should be noted that, the third term in F c (q, R B , R E , n) on the right-hand side of (39) and the third term in H c (q, R E , n) on the right-hand of (40) is both of the order O( 1 n ), which approach zero as n tends to ∞, so that these terms do not affect the exponents. Actually, the term ρ log 3 n on the right-hand side of (39) is not needed here but is needed in F c (q, R B , R E , n) on the right-hand side of (49) to follow under the maximum criterion.
Remark 3.8 (Non-Concatenation):
It is sometimes useful to consider the special case with V ≡ X as random variables over V = X . In this case the above quantities φ(ρ|W B , q, r ),
where the reliability function with (45) with c(x) − instead of − c(x) is earlier found in Gallager [11] and (45) with c(x) − instead of − c(x) applied to Poisson channels is found in Wyner [15] , while the secrecy function with (46) intervenes for the first time in this paper.
Recall that, so far, upper bounds on the error probability B n and the divergence distance δ E n are based on the averaged criteria as mentioned in Section I.C. Alternatively, instead of the averaged criteria B n and δ E n , we can define the maximum criteria m-B n and m-δ E n as follows.
With these criteria, using Markov inequality ‡ applied to (43) and (44), we obtain, instead of Theorem 3.4, Theorem 3.5:
) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with additive cost constraint , then there exists a pair (ϕ n , ψ B n ) of encoder (satisfying cost constraint ) and decoder such that
Remark 3.9 (Average vs. Maximum Criteria):
Bound (49) is well known in channel coding (see Gallager [11] ), whereas bound (50) is taken into consideration for the first time in this paper.
In channel coding, which of the averaged B n or the maximum m-B n we should take would be rather a matter of preference or the context. On the other hand, however, which of the averaged δ E n or the maximum m-δ E n we should take is a serious matter from the viewpoint of secrecy. This is because, even with small δ E n , we cannot exclude a possibility that the divergence distance D(P (i) n ||π n ) is very large for some particular i ∈ M n , and hence m-δ E n is also very large, which implies that the message i is not saved from a serious risk of successful decryption by Eve. On the other hand, with small m-δ E n , every message i ∈ M n is guaranteed to be kept highly confidential against Eve as well. Thus, we prefer the criterion m-δ E n as well as m-B n in this paper. In view of Remark 3.7, we are tempted to go further over the properties of the functions
In particular, we are interested in the behavior of the functions
We then keep the message set S n and throw out the rest to obtain Theorem 3.5. This causes the term ρ log 3 n to intervene on the right-hand side of (39).
we have following lemma, where we let I (q, W ) denote the mutual information between the input q and its output via the channel W .
Proof: See Appendix C. This lemma is used later to prove Theorems 3.7, 3.8.
C. Strengthening of Theorem 3.3
Let us now consider strengthening Theorem 3.3. Since it holds that
, and hence
Therefore, it is concluded again by virtue of the central limit theorem that, as in the proof (Appendix B) of Theorem 3.3, we have
where v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) ∈ V n and, with any constant a such that 1/2 < a < 1
so that T 0 in the proof (Appendix B) of Theorem 3.3 can be replaced by 
Thus, by introducing the upper bound
where s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary number, we can strengthen upper bounds (35) and (36) (55) and (56) do not affect the exponents of exponential decay in n for B n and δ B n . Accordingly, instead of (39), (40) and (41), (42), let us define
where the functions φ(ρ|W B , q, s, r ) and φ(−ρ|W E , q, s, r ) are defined as in (59) and (60) at the bottom of the page. Then, Theorems 3.4, 3.5 with the
thus modified are guaranteed to give the performance better than or equal to the original version only with the term e (1+ρ)r[ −c(x)] . However, here we do not go into the details of its analysis. The case with r = 0 will be used later in Section VII to establish the reliability and secrecy functions for concatenated Poisson wiretap channels.
D. δ-Secrecy Capacity With Cost Constraint
Suppose that we are given a stationary memoryless wiretap channel (W B , W E ), and consider any Markov chain such that
Then, we have Theorem 3.7: Let (W B , W E ) be a stationary memoryless wiretap channel with cost constraint . Then, the δ-secrecy capacity (cf. Section II.C) is given by
under the maximum criterion (m-B n , m-δ E n ), where the supremum on the right-hand side ranges over all V X satisfying (61) and E[c(X)] ≤ . § Proof: It is not difficult to verify that the converse part
holds (see [9] , [14] ). Therefore, it suffices only to show the opposite inequality (achievability part). To do so, let V 0 → X 0 → Y 0 Z 0 denote the Markov chain to attain the supremum on the right-hand side of (62) and let (W + B , W + E ) indicate the concatenated wiretap channel of (W B , W E ) using the auxiliary channel P X 0 |V 0 . Then, with q = P V 0 it is easy to observe that
. Furthermore, with an arbitrarily small number τ > 0 we set as
After the submission of this paper, Hou and Kramer [8] independently obtained formula (62) for the case without cost constraint (i.e., c(x) = = 1 for all x ∈ X ) under the finite alphabet assumption; they call it the effective secrecy capacity.
and hence
which together with Theorem 3.5 concludes that both of the error probability B n and the divergence distance δ E n exponentially decay with increasing n, provided that n is sufficiently large. Thus, the rate R B = I (q, W 
under the maximum criterion (m-B n , m-δ E n ), where the supremum on the right-hand side ranges over all X satisfying (61) and E[c(X)] ≤ .
Proof: In the light of Theorem 3.7, it suffices to show that
which is seen as follows.
where in the last step we have used the more capability.
IV. TRADEOFF OF RELIABILITY AND SECRECY
Thus far, we have established the general computable formulas for the reliability function F c (q, R B , R E , +∞) and the secrecy function H c (q, R E , +∞) with the stationary memoryless wiretap channel under cost constraint. From the viewpoint of secure communications, these should be regarded as a pair of functions but not as separate ones, which then enables us to quantify the tradeoff of reliability and secrecy. It should be emphasized that in wiretap channel coding it is one of the crucial problems how to control tradeoff of reliability and secrecy. In order to elucidate this specifically, in this section we focus on wiretap channels (W B , W E ) consisting of two BSC's (Binary Symmetric Channel) with crossover probabilities ε y for Bob and ε z against Eve (0 ≤ ε y < ε z ≤ 1/2), because this class of wiretap channels are quite tractable but still very informative. Reliability and secrecy functions with cost constraint for nonconcatenated BSC and rate shifting (ε y = 0.1,
On the basis of the paired functions, we can consider several ways to control the tradeoff of reliability and secrecy. Typical four ways are considered and discussed in the following. A typical pair of reliability and secrecy functions in this BSC case is depicted in Fig. 2 . It should be noted here that for any pair of BSC's one is degraded (and hence also is more capable) with respect to the other one, so that in calculating the δ-secrecy capacity δ-C s ( ) we can invoke formula (64) with q = P X in Theorem 3.8 (along with Lemma 3.1). More specifically, let q indicate the input maximizing Fig. 2 . The input q in all the figures to follow denotes the maximizing one in this sense.
A. Tradeoff of Reliability and Secrecy by Rate Shifting
First of all, Fig. 2 immediately suggests a primitive and simple way (rate shifting) of the tradeoff: moving R E (resolvability rate) while keeping R B (coding rate) unchanged enables us to control the tradeoff between the reliability exponent and the secrecy exponent, i.e., increasing R E causes stronger secrecy but with lower reliability, whereas decreasing R E causes higher reliability but with weaker secrecy. A technological intuition is that increasing secrecy requires "expanding" each signaling point into multiple, which is harmful from a reliability standpoint.
B. Tradeoff of Reliability and Secrecy by Rate Exchange
One more way to control such a tradeoff is to handle rates R B , R E , where the enhancement of secrecy is attained at the expense of rate R B but not at the expense of reliability: with the same exponents F c (q, R B , R E , +∞), H c (q, R E , +∞) as above, we let R E increase while keeping the sum R B + R E unchanged, which implies decrease of rate R B but no expense of reliability, because then the value of H c (q, R E , +∞) increase but that of F c (q, R B , R E , +∞) remains unchanged. See Fig. 3 . A technological meaning of this tradeoff is as follows: suppose that a codeword consists of R B information bits, R E random bits and R H check bits in a memory device. The operation of rate exchange corresponds to shifting of the partition between R B information bits and R E random bits, while R B + R E is unchanged. 
C. Tradeoff of Reliability and Secrecy by Concatenation
Now, let us consider another BSC with crossover probability ε v as an auxiliary channel P X |V : V → X for concatenation. Then, the reliability and secrecy functions for both of the nonconcatenated and concatenated BSC wiretap channels can be depicted together in Fig. 4 . We observe from this figure that, with fixed rates R B , R E , ¶ concatenation makes reliability for Bob decrease but makes secrecy against Eve increase, which is guaranteed by Theorem 3.2. Especially, we can compute numerically this tradeoff of reliability and secrecy in terms of their exponents F c (q, R B , R E , +∞) and H c (q, R E , +∞). Notice, from the technological point of view, the auxiliary channel can easily be simulated by using a random number ¶ Rate Exchange vs. Concatenation: Let us recall that the tradeoff by rate exchange necessitates us to "simultaneously" change both of R B and R E while the sum R B + R E is kept unchanged. However, imagine that one may not want to do rate change itself for some practical reason, but still wants to control the tradeoff. In such a case, the tradeoff by concatenation greatly helps, because it does not require to change the rates R B , R E (both are unchanged), but still we can effectively control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy. The tradeoff by concatenation technique is effective as well, irrespective of whether the channel is more capable or not. generator implemented by Alice. More importantly, the implementation of concatenation (auxiliary channel) using a random number generator is technologically indispensable to achieve the secrecy capacity when the channel is not more capable (or not less noisy). So, the concatenation technique has two kind of technological advantages, one is to control the tradeoff and the other to achieve the secrecy capacity.
D. Tradeoff of Reliability and Secrecy by Change of Cost Constraint
The fourth way to control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy is to change cost constraint . Generally speaking, relaxing cost constraint brings about increase of reliability and decrease of secrecy, whereas strengthening cost constraint brings about decrease of reliability and increase of secrecy, as is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. This is because relaxing of cost constraint will increase the ability of implementing, based on adaptive fitting of the input distribution q to the allowed cost , good codes with finer decoding regions at the fixed rate R B + R E , and hence leading to higher reliability and at the same time leading to weaker secrecy at the fixed rate R E . Notice here that finer decoding regions will decrease the ability of deceiving Eve; and vice versa. From the technological point of view, this implies that cheaper cost can attain stronger secrecy but with lower reliability.
V. SECRECY CAPACITY OF POISSON WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider application of Theorem 3.8 to the Poisson wiretap channel to determine its secrecy capacity.
First of all, let us define the Poisson wiretap channel (see [3] , [15] , [16] ). The input process to the Poisson channel is a waveform denoted by X t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) satisfying X t ≥ 0 for all t, where T is an arbitrarily large time span. We assume that the input process is not only peak power limited, i.e., 0 ≤ X t ≤ 1 for all t but also average power limited, i.e.,
The output signal to be received by the legitimate receiver Bob is a Poisson counting process Y t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) with instantaneous rate A y X t + λ y (λ y ≥ 0 is the dark current, an A y > 0 specifies attenuation of signal) such that
and, for 0 ≤ t, t + τ ≤ T (τ > 0),
Similarly, the output signal to be received by the eavesdropper Eve is a Poisson counting process Z t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) with instantaneous rate A z X t + λ z . We now want to discretize the continuous time process like this into a discrete time process in order to make the problem more tractable with asymptotically negligible loss of performance. To do so, we follow the way that Wyner [15] has demonstrated, and for the reader's convenience we review here his formulation to be exact. Let > 0 be an arbitrary very small constant. Then, we assume the following.
a) The channel input X t is constant for 
where we have put
Furthermore, a given fixed constant > 0 small enough, define the whole time interval T = n , where n denotes the block length of the DMC. Then, the power constraint (66) is equivalent to
where the additive cost c(x) is defined as c(x) = x for x = 0, 1. We are now almost ready to apply Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.5 to find secrecy capacities and reliability/secrecy functions. However, since Theorem 3.8 holds only for more capable channels, we need to impose some restriction on the class of Poisson wiretap channels as above formulated. In this connection, we introduce the concept of degradedness of channels as follows: 
In this connection, we have the following theorems:
Theorem 5.1 ( [3], [16]): A Poisson wiretap channel is degraded if
and
Theorem 5.2 ( [9]): A Poisson wiretap channel is more capable if it is degraded.
Thus, in the sequel, we confine ourselves to the class of Poisson wiretap channels satisfying (77) and (78) to guarantee the application of Theorem 3.8, where we assume that at least one of them holds with strict inequality; otherwise the problem is trivial.
With these preparations, we now go to the problem of determining the secrecy capacity. Let X be a channel input, and Y, Z be the channel output via W B , W E , respectively, due to X. Following Wyner [15] with q = Pr{X = 1}, we directly compute the mutual informations to have
More exactly, we should say that the channel W E is degraded with respect to the channel W B . Here, with abuse of notation, we simply say
Then, it is evident that
Moreover,
where the inequality follows from (77) and (78). Therefore, σ (q) is strictly concave and takes the maximum value at the unique q = q * in the interval (0, 1) with σ (q * ) = 0. 
under the maximum criterion (m-B n , m-δ E n ), where q = q * is the unique solution in (0, 1) of the equation:
and q * = min(q * , ).
(86) Proof: We develop σ (q) in (81) as follows:
Then, a direct computation shows that
Hence, the solution q = q * of the equation σ (q) = 0 is given by
which is equivalent to
On the other hand, 
where we used (89) in the last step. Consequently, with q * = min(q * , ), 
Since Theorem 3.8 claims that the left-hand side of (92) gives the δ-secrecy capacity per channel use, it is concluded that the δ-secrecy capacity δ-C s ( ) per second is given by (84). Example 5.1: It is easy to check that, in the special case without cost constraint (i.e., = 1 and hence q * = q * ), (84) boils down to
which coincides with the average criterion formula for the w-C s (1) as already developed in the continuous time framework by Laourine and Wagner [3] with the same equation as (85). As for the definition of w-C s ( ), see Section II. From the security point of view, formula (93) is stronger than the formula for w-C s (1) as was discussed in Section II.C, though δ-C s (1) = w-C s (1). Example 5.2: Let us quote here the worst case scenario as demonstrated in [3] specified by
In this case, it is shown in [3] that q * is given by
It is then also easy to verify that (84) reduces to
Moreover, in the particular case with s = 0 (no dark current), (95) reduces to
VI. RELIABILITY AND SECRECY FUNCTIONS OF POISSON WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider application of Theorem 3.5 to the Poisson wiretap channel to evaluate its reliability and secrecy functions. Here too, as in the previous section, we use the same two-input two-output stationary memoryless channel model specified with the transition probabilities and the cost constraint with parameters (70) ∼ (75). In this section we focus on Poisson wiretap channels without concatenation (i.e., V ≡ X; cf. Remark 3.8), and later in Section VII extend it to the case of Poisson wiretap channels with concatenation. Also, we assume that the conditions for degradedness (77) and (78) in Theorem 5.1 are satisfied.
A. Reliability Function
The first concern in this section is on the behavior of the reliability function for Bob. Formula (49) of Theorem 3.5 with q = P X is written as
where we have set E B0 (ρ, q, r ) = φ(ρ|W B , q, r ). Let us first evaluate E B0 (ρ, q, r ). Taking account of (46), we have
(It should be noted here that in evaluation of (98) Wyner [15] used c(x) − instead of − c(x), which causes some subtle irrelevance.) With q = q(1), an elementary calculation using (70) and (71) leads, up to the order O( ), to
First, in order to maximize E B0 (ρ, q, r ) with respect to r , set
Then,
which means that g(r ) is strictly concave. It is evident that
where we have used that cost constraint Ec(X) ≤ is written as q ≤ . Consequently, we have
and hence, up to the order O( ),
On the other hand, (97) is rewritten as (103) is the exponent per channel use, so that
gives the exponent per second. Therefore,
gives the exponents per second. Thus, taking account of T = n , it turns out that (103) is equivalent to
We notice that formula (104) together with (105) coincides with that established by Wyner [1] for non-wiretap Poisson channels, although the ways of derivation are different.
Since E B (ρ, q) is concave in ρ (see Gallager [11] ), the supremum
is specified by the equation:
Carrying out a direct calculation of the left-hand side of (106), it follows that
which together with (102) and (105) gives the parametric representation of the reliability function under the maximum criterion m-B n with parameter ρ. Remark 6.1: The function
can be derived by eliminating ρ from (105) using (107), and is zero at
and f B (R B + R E , q) is convex and positive in the range:
B. Secrecy Function
Let us now turn to the problem of evaluating the secrecy function against Eve. We proceed in parallel with the above case of reliability function. Formula (50) with q = P X of Theorem 3.5 is written as
where we have set E E0 (ρ, q, r ) = φ(−ρ|W E , q, r ). Let us evaluate E E0 (ρ, q, r ). Taking account of (46), we have
With q = q(1), an elementary calculation using (72) and (73) leads, up to the order O( ), to
In order to first maximize E E0 (ρ, q, r ) with respect to r , set
which means that h(r ) is strictly concave. It is evident that
On the other hand, (110) is rewritten as (116) is the exponent per channel use, so that
gives the exponents per second. Thus, taking account of T = n , it turns out that (116) is equivalent to
Since E E (ρ, q) is concave in ρ, the supremum
is specified by the equation;
Carrying out a direct calculation of the left-hand side of (119), it follows that
which together with (115) and (118) gives the parametric representation of the secrecy function under the maximum criterion m-δ E n with parameter ρ. 
Remark 6.2: The function
can be derived by eliminating ρ from (118) using (120), and is zero at
and f E (R E , q) is convex and positive in the range:
It should be noted here that the form of the function f E (R, q) is the same as that of f B (R, q) in (108) of Remark 6.1, while they are positive in the opposite directions, i.e., (122) and R E > h E (q) correspond to (109) and R B + R E < h B (q), respectively. Remark 6.3: As was stated in the previous section, degradedness implies more capability, so that it holds in the nondegenerated case that I (q; W B ) > I (q; W E ) for some q owing to the assumed degradedness, which guarantees that the secrecy function curve crosses the reliability function curve. This property enables us to control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (cf. Section IV.). It should be noted here that in the above arguments the common input probability q is shared by both the reliability function and the secrecy function. This implies that maximization over q should not be taken separately for the reliability function and the secrecy function, but should be taken for I (q; W B ) − I (q; W E ) to achieve the δ-secrecy capacity δ-C s ( ) of the wiretap channel, as long as q satisfies the cost constraint q ≤ . A typical case is illustrated in Fig. 7 .
VII. CONCATENATION FOR POISSON WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we investigate the effects of concatenation for performance of Poisson wiretap channels. We first observe a basic property (invariance) of Poisson wiretap channel under concatenation (on the basis of Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.8).
Here too, we use the notation as used in Sections V, VI. (77) and (78). Proof: Set the transition probabilities P X |V of the auxiliary binary channel as
where we assume that 1 ≥ a > b ≥ 0. Then, the transition probabilities of the concatenated channel (W
Notice that the concatenated channel is also a Poisson wiretap channel, and let the peak power and dark currents of the concatenated channel be denoted by A + y , A + z , λ + y , λ + z , respectively, then we obtain
which means that concatenation has the effect of not only attenuating peak powers to a factor of a − b but also augmenting a factor of b to dark currents. Recall that we have set as
According to (133), set
then
from which it follows that
Moreover, from (130) and (132) it follows that
which completes the proof. 
with q = Pr{V = 1}. Therefore, solving (139) with respect to q, we see that the problem with cost constraint
where ≥ b is assumed (cf. Section III.C with c(1) = a, c(0) = b). Thus, based on (137) ∼ (140), we can develop the same arguments on the secrecy capacity as well as on the reliability/secrecy functions as in Sections V and VI, which will be briefly summarized in the sequel.
A. Secrecy Capacity
The following theorem is the concatenation counterpart of Theorem 5.3 without concatenation. 
(143) Proof: It is not difficult to check that 0 < q * < 1 as was shown in Section V. Then, it suffices to proceed in parallel with the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Example 7.1: It is easy to check that, in the special case without cost constraint (i.e., = a and hence q * = q * ), (141) reduces to
with equation (142).
B. Reliability Function Theorem 7.3:
The maximum error probability m-B n for (W
Furthermore, the ρ to attain the supremum in (145) is specified by
which together with (146) and (147) 
Furthermore, the ρ to attain the supremum in (149) is specified by (77) and (78) with superscript "+," it suffices to replace A z , λ z , τ z , E E (ρ, q) in (115), (118) and (120) by
respectively. This proof is actually equivalent to the case with r = 0 in (56) in Theorem 3.6.
Typical forms of reliability and secrecy functions of Poisson wiretap channel with and without concatenation are depicted together in Fig. 8 .
VIII. SECRECY CAPACITY OF GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we first consider application of Theorem 3.8 to the discrete time stationary memoryless Gaussian wiretap channel to determine the δ-secrecy capacity. Let the Gaussian wiretap channel be denoted by (W B , W E ) and the input by X, and let Y, Z be the outputs via channels W B , W E , respectively, due to the input X, i.e.,
where A y > 0, A z > 0 are positive constants specifying attenuation of signal, and N y , N z are Gaussian additive noises with variances σ 2 y , σ 2 z , respectively. Here, we have an analogue of Theorem 5.1.
Proof:
whereσ ≥ 0 follows from (155). Then, there exists a fictitious Gaussian noiseÑ with varianceσ 2 that is independent from N y such that
where "U V " means that U and V are subject to the same statistics. In view of (155), this means that A z X + N z can be obtained by adding the fictitious noiseÑ and attenuating A y X + N y +Ñ . Hereafter, we assume that condition (155) 
under the maximum criterion (m-B n , m-δ E n ). Example 8.1: A weak secrecy version of formula (156) with A y = A z = 1 is found earlier in Cheong and Hellman [17] : under the average criterion,
Proof of Theorem 8.2: Define the differential entropy for probability density function f (u) by
We now observe the following equivalence:
On the other hand, Liu and Viswanath [18] guarantees that the maximization on the right-hand side is attained by a Gaussian density P X with variance σ 2 ≤ . It is then easy to check that
where in the last step we have used (155). Susbtituting (160) into (158) and rearranging it, we eventually obtain
which together with Theorem 3.8 concludes Theorem 8.2.
IX. RELIABILITY AND SECRECY FUNCTIONS OF GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we consider application of Theorem 3.5 to the Gaussian wiretap channel to evaluate its reliability and secrecy functions. To this end, it is convenient here to use, according to (49) and (50), formulas m-
Remark 9.1: These formulas (162) ∼ (165) are the continuous alphabet non-concatenated versions of (49) and (50) in Theorem 3.5 (cf. Remark 3.8).
A. Reliability Function
We first insert the transition probability density of the Gaussian channel W B :
and the input distributen for X:
into (164) to have
where s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary constant. Set
where β B ranges as
Use (169) and (170) (ρ, q, s) as a function E B (A B , β B , ρ) of
Hence,
Notice that the right-hand side of (173) 
On the other hand, E B (ρ)−ρ(R B + R E ) has a stationary point with respect to ρ, i.e.,
As a consequence, by means of (174) and (176), we obtain
Thus, we have 
for
whereas, for 0
So far we have established the formula for reliability function based on upper bound (B.8). In contrast with Theorem 9.1, Gallager [11] has derived another reliability function based on upper bound (38), leading to the exponent formula
instead of (164). It should be noted here that in (182) c(x)− appears instead of − c(x). Then, we have Theorem 9.2 (Reliability Function: Gallager): The reliability function of a Gaussian wiretap channel under the maximum criterion m-B n is given by
with β B = e 2(R B +R E ) . Formula (183) is valid in the range of R = R B + R E as follows:
For R less than the left-hand side of (184), we must choose ρ = 1 yielding where
Two reliability functions derived in the above are depicted in Fig. 9 . Also, two critical rates R H,c , R G,c defined in (180) and (184) 
holds for all A B , which together with g(0) = 0 yields (186).
B. Secrecy Function
In this subsection, we evaluate the right-hand side of (163) on the secrecy function. The arguments here proceed in parallel with those in the previous subsection with due modifications and −ρ instead of ρ. Here too, we insert the transition probability density of the Gaussian channel W E :
and the input disturbution for X:
into (165) to have
where s ≥ 0 is an arbitrary constant. Here we set
then β E ranges as
Use (191) 
A stationary point with respect to β E (and hence also with respect to s) is specified by
Notice that the right-hand side of (195) is decreasing in β E because β E (1 − ρ) − A E ≥ 1 − ρ owing to (193) and that
Therefore, equation (195) has the unique solution for β E , i.e.,
On the other hand, E E + ρ R E has a stationary point with respect to ρ, i.e.,
From (195) and (197), it follows that
Furthermore, combining (194) with (198), we obtain
On the other hand, equation (195) can be solved for ρ as follows:
which inserted into (199) yields the following theorem: Theorem 9.3 (Secrecy Function): The secrecy function of a Gaussian wiretap channel under the maximum criterion m-δ E n is given by
with β E = e 2R E . Remark 9.2: It should be noted that the form of the function in (183) is the same as that in (201), but the ranges where they are valid are opposite, i.e., formula (201) is valid in the range of R E :
where parameter ρ = 0 corresponds to R E = 
with
where it is evident that β E ranges as
As was shown in the proof of Theorem 9.1, (203) is rewritten as a function of A E , β E , ρ as follows:
Then, it is not difficult to verify that
Moreover, the equation
Then, from (208) and (209) it follows that
Thus, we have Theorem 9.4 (Secrecy Function: Gallager-Type): The secrecy function E B (R B , R E ) of a Gaussian wiretap channel under the maximum criterion m-δ E n is given by the following parametric representation with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1:
for R E ≥ 1 2 log(1 + A E ). Two secrecy functions derived in the above are depicted in Fig. 10 .
Remark 9.3: In Fig. 11 we see that as for the reliability function Gallager bound outperforms our bound, whereas as for the secrecy function our bound outperforms Gallager-type bound. It is interesting to observe a kind of dualities holding among Theorem 9.1 ∼ Theorem 9.4, which is illustrated in Fig. 12. X. CONCLUDING REMARKS So far we have established the δ-secrecy capacity with cost constraint (in the strongest and maximized secrecy sense) as well as the pair of reliability and secrecy functions for the general wiretap channel, and also for the stationary memoryless wiretap channel such as binary symmetric wiretap channels (BSC), Gaussian wiretap channels and Poisson wiretap-channels. The key concept of the pair of reliability exponent function and secrecy exponent function has played the crucial role throughout in this paper.
Subsequently, we have introduced the formula for the δ-secrecy capacity as the strongest one among others, which was invoked in many places in this paper when cost constraint is considered. Incidentally, superiority of the maximum secrecy criterion to the average secrecy criterion was demonstrated.
Next, we have investigated in details one of typically important channels: the Poisson wiretap channel, whose secrecytheoretic features have been clarified again from the viewpoint of the pair of reliability and secrecy functions, where the formula for the δ-secrecy capacity also naturally followed from the same point of view.
Similarly, also for the Gaussian wiretap channel it was possible to establish the δ-secrecy capacity and the pair of reliability and secrecy functions as well, where we had four formulas for reliability and secrecy functions depending on different upper bounding techniques on the characteristic function χ(x) to ensure to satisfy the cost constraint: one of them is due to Gallager [11] and the other three are demonstrated for the first time in this paper. These were shown to have two-folded dualities (cf. Fig. 12 ). An open problem is left here to make clear the reason. The δ-secrecy capacity formula Fig. 12 . The reliability function in Theorem 9.1 (this paper) has the same form as that of the secrecy function in Theorem 9.4 (this paper: Gallagertype), whereas the secrecy function in Thoerm 9.3 (this paper) has the same form as that of the reliability function in Theorem 9.2 (Gallager) .
for the Gaussian wiretap channel under the maximum criterion was shown to be stronger than that of Cheong and Hellman [17] from the viewpoint of secrecy.
Moreover, we have introduced the concept of concatenation in order to expand performance of the wiretap channel. Four ways to control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy were shown to be possible on the basis of rate shifting, rate exchange, concatenation, and change of cost constraint, respectively.
Interestingly enough, it turned out that cost constraint (with cost c(x)) on P X n of the concatenated channel (W The proof here just parallels that given in Han and Verdú [13, p. 768] . First, set P V n = Q and generate a random code C = {V
In view of (26), we see that any realization of
, respectively, satisfies cost constraint . For each message i ∈ M n ≡ {1, 2, . . . , M n }, the stochastic encoder ϕ n : M n → V n produces the uniform distribution over C i . The decoder ψ B n : Y n → M n tries to decode all of these M n L n codewords V immediately follows from Gallager [11] with maximum likelihood decoding, where E C denotes the expectation with respect to the random code C.
Next, for each i ∈ M n we use the subcode C i to produce an output distribution on Z n that approximates enough the target output distribution π n on Z n generated via channel W n+ E : V n → Z n due to the input distribution P V n (i.e., π n (z) = v∈V n W n+ E (z|v)P V n (v)) (the resolvability * * problem). Let U n i be the random variable taking values uniformly in the subcode C i , and let Z n i be the output via channel W n+ E due to the input U n i (i = 1, 2, . . . , M n ), with the probability distribution of Z n i denoted by P (i) n . We now evaluate the degree of approximation in terms of the divergence D(P (i) n ||π n ). By symmetry of the subcodes, we can focus on the case i = 1 without loss of generality. For notational simplicity, with P Z n = π n , set
Then, we have
n ||π n ) = z∈Z n c 1 ∈V n . . . , * * Csiszár [7] is the first who has looked at the secrecy problem with wiretap channels from the viewpoint of resolvability devised by Han and Verdú [13] .
that is, 
2)
It is easy to see that lim n→∞ μ n = 1 if x∈X P X (x)c(x) < ; and lim n→∞ μ n = 1/2 otherwise (i.e., x∈X P X (x)c(x) = ), by means of the central limit theorem. We rewrite μ n as follows:
then, by means of Markov inequality ‡ ‡ there exists a subset T 0 ⊂ V n such that
Obviously, lim n→∞ α n = lim n→∞ β n = lim n→∞ γ n (v) = 1 if x∈X P X (x)c(x) < ; otherwise lim inf n→∞ α n ≥ lim n→∞ β n = 1 − 1/ √ 2 and lim inf n→∞ γ n (v) ≥ 1 − 1/ √ 2. Thus, we can definẽ ‡ ‡ Markov inequality tells that if v∈V P X |V (X |v)P V (v) ≥ 1−κ then there exist a subset V 0 ⊂ V such that P V (V 0 ) ≥ 1 − √ κ and P X |V (X |v) ≥ 1 − √ κ for all v ∈ V 0 . which obviously specify a probability distribution and a conditional probability distribution. On the other hand, notice that χ(x) can be upper bounded (for all x ∈ X n ) as
c(x i ) , (B.8) where r ≥ 0 is an arbitrary number. Now considerP V n (v) andP X n |V n (x|v) as Q(v) in (23) and P X n |V n (x|v) in (27), respectively, to obtain Next consider about Assertion 3). In view of the form of the right-hand side of (C.1), we can invoke the same argument as in Gallager [11] to conclude that F c (q, R B , R E , +∞) is monotone strictly decreasing convex function of R B + R E for R B + R E < I (q, W + B ), from which combined with Assertion 1) the positivity follows. Similarly for Assertion 4).
